The Reserve Bank of India is extremely reluctant to allow new banks to enter the field. Normally, the finance ministry lets it do what it likes. But in the early 1990s, when the payments crisis forced the government to rethink its policies, it also tried to make the RBI do so. The RBI issued 10 bank licences in 1993. Some years later, Yashwant Sinha was keen to make a name as a reformer, and was persuaded of the benefits of competition; he pressed the RBI to give some licences. But he was not very forceful, so in 2001, the RBI issued licences to two banks; fewer than two would have looked ridiculous. In 2004, the new Congress government also came in with ambitions of reforms, and Rakesh Mohan became finance secretary. In his brief tenure he appointed the Percy Mistry committee, which recommended that the RBI should be less stringent in the restrictions it had imposed on the ownership structure of private banks. The RBI’s own Tarapore committee suggested in 2006 that it should be less prejudiced against investment in banks by industrial houses. The Raghuram Rajan committee, reporting in 2008, suggested licensing a large number of small banks. But the governor, Y.V. Reddy, stonewalled, trumpeting central bank independence, and P. Chidambaram did not have the appetite for public rows with him. So the RBI got away with resolute inaction. Pranab Mukherjee replaced Chidambaram as finance minister in early 2009. He too pressed the RBI on bank licences; he is politically powerful, and more difficult to put off. So the RBI drafted a discussion paper, and put it out a year ago. It summarized the conditions it had imposed on new bank licensees in the two rounds of 1993 and 2001, described alternatives in respect of each condition, and arguments for and against them. Now it has published its conclusions, which it has ostensibly drawn from the discussion. Stripped of jargon, its conclusions are as follows. It is dead against foreigners investing in banks. It may allow Indian businessmen — “promoters” — provided that they are found squeaky clean by itself and all arms of the government. The promoters’ companies must be professionally managed; the promoters must not figure too prominently on the board of directors. The RBI knows everything; if a promoter thinks a company does not belong to his group and the RBI tells him it does, he had better not argue with it. It may ask where the promoters got the money to invest in their companies; if it is not out of clean sources like government salaries and pensions, they may be rejected. Stockbrokers, real estate guys and property developers should not even think of applying; the RBI is dead against them. The RBI may seek opinions from other branches of the government; if one of them refuses to give someone a clean chit, he is gone. I cannot imagine any promoter whose companies would not have had an argument with income tax; that department believes in overcharging and then retreating inch by inch. The government will act as a cabal in choosing promoters, and the RBI has equipped itself to reject any promoter it does not like. The RBI will issue licences to a new animal called the NOHC — non-operational holding company. A promoter will be asked to transfer all his financial businesses to this NOHC. One may ask, if anyone who had anything to do with the stock market is summarily excluded, what financial businesses can a promoter have? The answer is, what Indians with their penchant for long and awkward nomenclatures call non-banking finance companies. The RBI has been regulating these for a dozen years or so; if it finds one of them squeaky clean, it may allow its promoter to bid for a bank. But he cannot just convert it into a bank. First he must divide the NBFC into two — one with all the rural branches, the other one without — only the first one will get a banking licence. Then he must set up an NOHC and transfer his shares to it. But before it can bid, his NOHC must make sure it has no debt — only equity is allowed. If the NOHC fails to jump through all the hoops, his rural NBFC will just have to go back to its old business. A bank must have share capital of at least Rs 500 crore. The NOHC must make a public issue within two years after it gets a licence. The NOHC may put in anything over Rs 200 crore, but if it does so, it must sell off all equity in excess of 40 per cent within two years, 20 per cent within 10 years and 15 per cent within 12 years. After that, it must stay at 15 per cent unless the RBI allows. The bank will grow, and as it grows, it will need more capital. Whenever the capital crosses a threshold of Rs 500 crore, the bank must ask for the RBI’s approval. The promoters must get at least 85 per cent of all extra capital from outside. In other words, the RBI is looking for promoters who would set up a bank out of charity, take the risk and expect no returns from it except what portfolio investors would get. More than a half of the NOHC’s directors should be independent of the promoter. They may, of course, be retired bankers and civil servants. More jobs for old boys.
The RBI recognizes that it is a bit unreasonable to expect promoters to set up a bank, sell off most of its shares and then twiddle their fingers. So it will make them twiddle their fingers for only three years; after that, an NOHC will be allowed to set up financial institutions other than banks. But they cannot do any business that the RBI reserves for banks. In other words, no one will be allowed to compete with banks except the RBI’s chosen favourites. Applications for a bank licence must include a business plan. In it, promoters had better give a lot of bumph about how they are going to serve the poorest of the poor, and how they will set up lots of branches in Kashmir, Nagaland, Maoland, Bad Land, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal, and every other place where existing banks do not care to go. If anyone is stupid enough to own more than 5 per cent of a bank’s equity capital, he had better write to the RBI and ask for its forgiveness and approval. If he has lost his mind and let his and his group’s holdings go over 10 per cent, the RBI will — well, it does not say what it will do to him because it just cannot imagine such a thing happening. Even if a promoter fulfils all the above conditions, the RBI does not promise him a licence, for “the new banks need to have strength and efficiency to work in a highly competitive environment”. Competitive environment? Under the RBI? It must be joking.
The Telegraph